BZHRK "Molodets" with MKR RT-23UTTH (15Zh61)

[The beginning of the topic has been skipped because my copy of the book is missing pages 332–340 and notes 162–166.]

The RT-23UTTH missile carries a MIRV-type multiple warhead with 10 warheads with a yield of 500 kt each. The stage for breeding warheads is a “pushing” design, the warheads are placed in one tier, the engine of the stage is a four-chamber liquid propellant rocket engine. Includes a propulsion system, a control system and a set of missile defense systems. The stages are separated by detonating extended charges and a powder pressure accumulator (PAA). The head part is covered by fairings of variable geometry (due to the overall limitations of the railway car), which is reset after passing through the dense layers of the atmosphere.

The inertial control system ensures inspections and continuous monitoring of the technical condition of the rocket, pre-launch preparation and launch of the rocket, flight control and deployment of warheads with high accuracy. The launch can be carried out from any suitable point on the combat patrol route.

Type of launcher for RT-23UTTH (RS-22V) - mobile, railway. This method of basing, despite the difficulties and disadvantages, made it possible to ensure high survivability of the missile, which was extremely important for a retaliatory strike weapon.

“...one BZHRK included a railway train with a standard configuration for the complex: three launch modules (each of three cars consists of a launcher with an ICBM in a TPK, a support unit with diesel generators, a launcher control station), a command module of seven cars, a tank with fuel and lubricants, four diesel locomotives DM-62.

To reduce the axial load on the track at the launcher, “special unloading devices” are used to redistribute part of the load to adjacent cars of the launch module. The control center and the starting module support unit are equipped with special devices for short-circuiting and tapping the ZOKS contact network. Each of the three launchers included in the BZHRK. can carry out launch both as part of a train and autonomously. When moving along the railway network, the BZHRK made it possible to quickly change the location of the starting position up to 1000 kilometers per day.

In the transport position, the ICBM is in a horizontal position inside the launch car; before launch, it is raised pneumatically into a vertical position in the TPK due to powder gases, for which it is equipped with a sliding roof with a hydraulic drive. The missiles could be launched from almost any point along the route. Therefore, the BZHRK was equipped with a high-precision navigation system. To carry out the launch, the train stops and the catenary is moved to the side using a special device. The launch container rises to a vertical position. After which the mortar launch of the rocket is carried out due to the pressure generated when the powder pressure accumulator is triggered. Already in the air, the rocket is tilted with the help of a powder accelerator and only after that the main engine is started. Deflecting the rocket made it possible to divert the propulsion engine jet from the launch complex and ensure its safety and stability.”

From the history of the creation of the missile system

For the first time, Soviet specialists became acquainted with the FAU-2 mobile missile system, mounted on railway platforms and placed in railway cars, in Germany in 1945. The idea of ​​creating a mobile railway complex and the first projects appeared in our country back in the 50s.

In OKB-301 under the leadership of S.A. Lavochkin was working on the option of placing the Burya intercontinental cruise missile on a railway platform. In OKB-586 under the leadership of M.K. Yangel, a rail-based version of the R-12 medium-range missile was developed. The train was supposed to include twenty pens, six of which had missile launchers. Both projects were not further developed.

Several rail options were developed in the 1960s. At OKB-1 under the leadership of S.P. Korolev, work was carried out on the project of a solid-propellant railway-based ICBM RT-2. In OKB-586 under the leadership of M.K. Yangel, the RT-21 and RT-22 railway complexes were developed. These projects were also not implemented.

On January 13, 1969, the Ministry of General Engineering issued an order “On the creation of a mobile combat railway missile system (BZHRK) with the RT-23 missile.” The development of the RT-23 missile began at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau under the leadership of M.K. Yangelya.

The mobile railway complex, having the characteristics of a soil complex, had an important advantage. A railway launcher could accommodate a rocket with a larger launch mass and the ability to deliver a larger payload to the target.

Writes A.V. Karpenko: “In May 1972, the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau began the “Guarantee” search work, which included research into the possibility of creating a solid-fuel rocket for silo and ground types of launches, and from March 1973 - to create a silo-based missile system with the RT-23 . When preparing proposals for the missile system within the framework of the research projects “Garantiya”, “Horizon” and other designers, solid-fuel ICBMs with a launch weight of 100 to 150 tons were developed for placement in well-protected silos and on railway mobile launchers. In October 1975, the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant began construction of a housing for the assembly of solid fuel engines for the RT-23 ICBM and SLBM.

By the mid-1970s. work on the BZHRK was gradually curtailed due to the complexity of creating and operating such a complex; only the RK with the RT-23 (15Zh44) missile was developed, placing it in a highly protected silo 15P744.

Previously interrupted work on the BZHRK at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau was resumed in 1976 after D.F. took office as Minister of Defense. Ustinova. By that time, the silo missile was being tested, and proposals were being prepared for a new version of the BZHRK. The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 1, 1979 specified the development of MIRVs for RT-23 missiles as part of the BZHRK. Therefore, simultaneously with the creation of the RT-23 silo-based complex, KB-4 KBSM was in full swing developing documentation for the 15P252 railway-based complex.

The creators of the world's first BZHRK faced big problems. Taking into account the difficulties that arose during its development, on July 23, 1976, the government adopted a resolution on development at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau under the leadership of M.K. Yangel mine version of the RT-23 under the index 15Zh44 with a monoblock warhead. The first preliminary design of a silo missile with a monoblock warhead was completed in March 1977.

The second, modified, preliminary design of a rocket with MIRV IN 15F143 and increased energy was completed in December 1979.

Flight testing of the silo version began in December 1982. However, on February 10, 1983, by decision of the USSR Defense Council, the RT-23 (15Zh44) missile was not accepted for service.

A new government decree on the development of the RT-23 railway missile system was issued on July 6, 1979. The Yuzhnoye Design Bureau continued to develop the railway version of the 15Zh52 missile, which was carried out simultaneously with the development of the silo version 15Zh44. In June 1980, the preliminary design of the RT-23 BZHRK with the 15Zh52 missile was completed. The launch complex was created at KBSM under the leadership of A.F. Utkin, the total number of direct allied companies was almost 30 enterprises - in particular, the Kalinin TsKB TM (chief designer L.D. Novikov), the Moscow TsKB TM (chief designer B.R. Aksyutin), the Bolshevik plant (chief designer N.G. Pervushev), KBTKhM (chief designers I.D. Brilev and M.I. Stepanov), Design Bureau of the Projector Plant (chief designers V.V. Okunev and V.N. Luzhkov), Novosibirsk Research Institute of Energy Engineering ( chief designer L.F. Otmakhov), PKBTSE (chief designer V.I. Okunev).”

On February 10, 1983, by decision of the USSR Defense Council, the railway-based RT-23 (15Zh52) missile was accepted for trial operation. The missile was tested at the Plesetsk test site until April 1985. This RK with the RT-23 (15Zh52) missile was not put on combat duty, being an intermediate option.

In November 1982, the development of the preliminary design of the RT-23UTTKh missile and BZHRK with improved railway launchers was completed.

On August 9, 1983, a government decree was issued to begin the development of the “Molodets” RT-23UGTH complex with a single missile for three types of deployment – ​​mine, railway and ground “Tselina-2”.

Flight tests of the RT-23UTTH (15Zh61) BZHRK missile were carried out from February 27, 1985 to December 22, 1987 from NIIP-53 (Mirny), a total of 32 launches were made. 18 trains were carried out for resource and transport tests, during which more than 400 thousand kilometers were covered on the country’s railways...”

A.V. Karpenko continues: “At the same time, the complex was being improved. Back in November 1982, a preliminary design of the RT-23UTTKh and BZHRK missiles with improved railway launchers and other necessary systems was developed. The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated August 9, 1983 set the development of a missile system with the RT-23UTTKh "Molodets" missile in three deployment options: combat railway 15P961, mobile ground "Tselina-2" and silo-based high security.

The project of the RT 23UTTH (15Zh61) missile and the 15P961 complex were based on technical and design solutions that underwent full-scale testing as part of the BZHRK with the RT-23 (15Zh52) missile. At the same time, new solutions introduced both into the missile and into the BZHRK made it possible to significantly increase the combat effectiveness of the 15P961 complex compared to 15P952. The RT-23 UTTH (15Zh61) ICBM itself, developed at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, is also unique; it is a three-stage solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile with an individually guided separating warhead and ten warheads. It had an inertial control system with on-board digital computer. A feature of the control system is the solution of a number of new problems: restoration of information in the computer after exposure to a nuclear explosion by rewriting it into a random access memory device from the information storage device on a magnetic disk; implementation of terminal guidance principles; the use of an elemental base with increased resistance to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion; interface with the "Signal-A" combat control system. Aiming of missiles is carried out using a ground-based gyrocompass and electro-optical means of transmitting azimuth to the on-board gyro-stabilized platform.”

After all types of tests, the BZHRK 15P961 was put into service on November 28, 1989. “Government decree in 1983-1985 provided for the installation of three traffic routes for the BZHRK with parking areas. As a result, in the main position area, a route with a length of about 2000 km was equipped in engineering terms and prepared for operation.”

The project provided that the rocket would be in a transport and launch container for the entire period of operation. The containers are placed on launchers in special railway cars. MIRV IN is equipped with ten warheads placed on a single-tier breeding platform.

The first stage of the RT-23 ICBM was unified with the first stage of the R-39 ballistic missile for submarines, designed by chief designer V. Makeev. The development of the engine for the first stage of the R-39 naval missile was carried out by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau until September 1973. Fire tests of the 3D65 engine as part of the rocket began in January 1980. Serial production of the first stages of the RT-23 and R-39 missiles has been launched at the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant. Serial production of third-stage engines 15D291 has been launched at the Perm Chemical Equipment Plant (PZHO).

The autonomous control system was developed at the Moscow Research Institute of Automation and Instrumentation under the leadership of V.L. Lapygina. The missile is equipped with a set of means to overcome missile defense. Mixed fuel and solid propellant charges for the RT-23 rocket were developed at NII-125 under the leadership of B.P. Zhukova.

The command module for controlling the RT-23 BZHRK launcher was developed at TsKB TM under the leadership of B.R. Aksyutin and A.A. Leontenkova.

The story is told by the General Director - General Designer of the State Enterprise "TsKB of Heavy Engineering" A.A. Leontenkov:

“When creating the command module of the BZHRK (the chief designer of the complex is Academician V.F. Utkin, the chief designer of the launcher is A.F. Utkin), we encountered a number of scientific and technical problems. It was necessary to ensure communication in the difficult electromagnetic environment associated with the electrification of railways. It was also necessary to ensure magnetic compatibility of various types of electronic equipment located in relatively small volumes. All these problems have been resolved by us.

To provide communications with our own antenna devices, we have developed retractable, built-in antennas and antennas placed under the radio-transparent roof of the car.”

Writes academician V.F. Utkin:

“It takes a lot of Pershings to destroy a missile train. This is not a one-on-one fight, as in the mine version, but the ratio is completely different... And therefore, this is, of course, a unique combat complex. The Americans also wanted to do something similar, but they were stopped, firstly, by private railways and, secondly, by the lack of an extensive railway network. Let us remember that they went through difficult times with railway transport, and aviation and road transport took the lead. Well, our country is so huge that it’s easy to get lost on our railways with our trains, and, therefore, for a potential enemy, the task of finding such missile systems becomes more complicated, which is what is required.”

From the book Dnieper Rocket and Space Center: “The development and creation for the first time in the world of a combat railway missile system (BZHRK), which is still on combat duty, makes it possible in the event of a surprise attack to maintain nuclear missile potential and strike back.”

Serial production of missiles was launched at the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant. The railway launcher was mass-produced by the Yurga Machine-Building Plant.

Chairman of the State Testing Commission Head of the Main Directorate for the Operation of Missile Weapons (GUERV) Colonel General G.N. Malinovsky writes:

“By the beginning of the 80s, when development of the R"G-23 UTTH missile system began, a number of problems in the field of materials, technology and design ideas had not yet been resolved on a national scale. These problems were practically solved against the backdrop of tests in full swing. Thus, during the development process, the first stage of the rocket was replaced with a stage with a more powerful fuel and a flight control system by rotating the nozzle.But in order to allow such changes in the design, it was necessary to carry out a colossal amount of all types of tests during the work of the state commission. positive stable results of the latest series of fire tests, the state commission recognized it as possible to change the composition of the rocket - to include a new first stage in it.

At the start of testing, the following issues had to be resolved:

– development, manufacturing and fire testing of nozzle blocks with a significantly increased expansion ratio;

– increasing the power of solid propellant charges by increasing the specific thermodynamic impulse;

– increasing the specific strength of organoplastics for rocket bodies and, most importantly, reducing the variation in their mechanical properties (this made it possible to increase the pressure from 60-70 to 100-150 atm);

– development of lightweight heat-protective coatings;

– the development of composite materials (carbon-carbon) with volumetric weaving and the manufacture of nozzle blocks from this material is a colossal gain in weight;

– reducing the scatter in the intra-ballistic characteristics of solid fuel by improving the quality of the substances included in the fuel;

– development of rotating sliding nozzles for the second and third stages and a rotating nozzle for the first stage of the rocket;
– creation of a control system that differs from existing ones in terms of increased accuracy, service life and minimum weight;

– development of special materials for promising warheads and other issues.

I repeat that not all of these problems had been solved by the time testing began.

Often during testing we faced a dilemma: to change something in the design, because a more modern solution to a particular problem had been found. But then goodbye to the previously accumulated stable statistics (which means additional testing time and additional rocket consumption will be required). After all, there are no, and cannot be, limits to such improvements. Therefore, the principle often worked: “the best is the enemy of the good.” But we made decisions that fundamentally improved the quality and characteristics of the missile system.”

On October 20, 1987, the first missile regiment with the 15P952 BZHRK with the RT-23 ICBM was put into trial operation in Kostroma. By mid-1988, 6-7 regiments were deployed (about 20 launchers in total, all near Kostroma). By 1991, three missile divisions armed with BZHRK and RT-23UTTH ICBMs were deployed (near Kostroma, the village of Bershet and the village of Gladkoe in the Krasnoyarsk Territory), each of which had four missile regiments. The division's base station near Kostroma is called "Romashka". The trains are located at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in stationary structures. When going on combat duty, the trains are dispersed.

Until the fall of 1991, 12 trains regularly ran along the railway lines of the Soviet Union, four of which were stationed in the Kostroma division, four in the city of Bershet in the Perm region, and four more in Gladkaya near Krasnoyarsk.

A train with strategic ballistic missiles looks like an ordinary train of refrigerated and passenger cars and is externally distinguished in that the three BZHRK refrigerators each have eight pairs of wheels instead of the four of conventional cars. This number of axles is due to the maximum permissible load on one axle of 25 tons, since the total weight of the car with the rocket is close to 200 tons.

The design of the cars includes systems for blocking shock absorbers and removing electrical wires that may end up above the car at the starting point.

“In the fall of 1991, Gorbachev and R. Reagan agreed to lay them down at permanent deployment points. At the same time, in response to the US initiative (cessation of the development of the railway-based ICBM "MX", which was undergoing field tests at that time), the former President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev agreed with the opinion of the Americans - that in order to strengthen mutual understanding between the two countries, it is better not to release the BZHRK into the open air Russia. They were extremely costly for American taxpayers, forcing the Pentagon to deploy an additional constellation of reconnaissance satellites. After all, each rocket train travels more than 1,000 kilometers per day, and in order to identify only one BZHRK among hundreds of trains plying throughout Russia, and then track the route of its movement, it would be necessary to increase the constellation of tracking satellites tenfold. It turned out to be impossible to implement such a project even in such a rich and technically developed country as the United States. Apparently fearing a lack of understanding from their taxpayers, American leaders tried to find - and did find - understanding from the Soviet president, who sincerely sympathized with the difficulties of the American people. And since then, the formidable missile carriers on rails have not been able to get beyond the technical territory of the unit.”

At the same time, Gorbachev hastened to announce the refusal to further deploy and modernize the RS-22V ICBM. By this, he limited the period of stay of missiles of this type on combat duty by the warranty period of operation. After the collapse of the USSR, the enterprises producing this missile found themselves outside of Russia, which finally signed the verdict on the RS-22, both railway and silo-based.

Speaking about the RS-22, I would like to say that this rocket is the embodiment of the latest achievements of science and technology. It differs from all other missiles in its high combat readiness, versatility, power, reliability and relative ease of operation. The loss of a group of missile systems with this missile caused a significant undermining of the combat readiness of the Strategic Missile Forces. And what’s worse, it led to the loss of a promising, new missile system that ensured the combat stability of the entire group of intercontinental missiles for the period until 2005. It is not difficult to calculate that the total number of 36 BZHRK missiles in service with 360 warheads on board is approximately equal in number to the entire group of Topol mobile complexes.

In 1991, NPO Yuzhnoye proposed using a RT-23 UTTH rocket to launch spacecraft into Earth orbit from an altitude of 10 kilometers, after dropping the rocket on a special parachute system from an An-124-100 heavy transport aircraft.

According to the START-2 treaty, the RT-23 UTTH missiles were subject to elimination before 2003.

Today, the last BZHRK was removed from combat duty, and the launch module of this system on August 3, 2006 - as a monument - was inaugurated in the exposition of BZHRK 15P961 in the Museum of Railway Equipment at the Warsaw Station in St. Petersburg. The BZHRK is one of the high-tech achievements of the domestic defense industry. Its reliability has been proven over time. As the developers noted, for more than 15 years of operation of the BZHRK, not a single, even tiny, incident occurred with it on the tracks.

Perhaps, after a while, Russia will remember the unique developments and technical solutions used and will return to creating similar weapon systems.

Strategic “Well done.” History of railway missile systems Mikhailov Vladimir Sergeevich

Elimination of BZHRK RT-23UTTH

Elimination of BZHRK RT-23UTTH

Until 1991, the BZHRK of three divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces carried out combat service on the railways of the USSR. This was a constant problem for the US military-political leadership. Based on this, it exerted constant pressure on the leadership of the USSR in order to eliminate this threat. And it achieved success in this. Since 1991, by decision of the state leadership of the USSR, BZHRK began to carry out combat duty at bases without traveling to the country's railway network. This almost completely deprived the BZHRK of any meaning in its existence. For more than 10 years, the BZHRKs were, as they say, laid up.

After the change of government leadership, the Russian side, during the negotiations on the preparation of the START-1 Treaty, which entered into force in December 1994, agreed to limit the warheads on mobile ground-based missiles and limit the combat patrols of these missiles. For mobile missile systems, more stringent liquidation procedures were envisaged than for stationary missiles. To exclude these missiles from the count, it was necessary to eliminate not only the launchers, but also the missiles themselves.

As a result, the START-1 Treaty limited the deployment of railway-based missile systems, and the deployed such systems were limited in movement and located only at permanent deployment points. The significance of these complexes as combat systems of Russian strategic nuclear forces was practically reduced to zero. By this time, there were 36 RT-23/RT-23UTTH missiles located in railway launchers. Each missile contained 10 warheads with powerful special charges. A retaliatory strike with these complexes would be devastating.

In the next START-2 Treaty, signed in January 1993, a key provision was the elimination of all “heavy class” ICBMs and mobile missile systems.

It is not surprising that the main efforts of the United States were aimed at limiting the functioning and subsequent elimination of Russian BZHRKs. To this end, the Americans achieved the inclusion of restrictive and liquidation articles and procedures in the texts of the START Treaty and its annexes, the implementation of which led to the destruction of our railway missile systems. These restrictions were one-sided; as it later became clear, they did not plan to deploy their own similar group in the United States.

This is confirmed, in particular, by the following. Thus, according to clause 10b of Article III of the treaty, the American side declared the MX missile as the existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers, while for some reason the tactical and technical characteristics for the railway version were not indicated. It was noted that the missile has not been deployed in a mobile version.

The question arises: where is the American BZHRK? Why haven’t the infrastructure facilities based there been declared? During the inspections, it turned out that the Americans did not even think about starting to retrofit air bases in the interests of deploying BZHRK.

At the turn of 1990-2000. In Western countries, an opinion has formed regarding the problems of eliminating the weapons being reduced, and above all the weapons that belonged to the former Soviet Union. The United States and other Western countries believed that assistance in resolving this issue was not a standard provision of foreign assistance, but a common cause of reducing the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction and preventing their proliferation.

The Russian Federation, as well as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, has adopted this approach. Plans for general action in this direction, with funding provided by the United States, are called “Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs (CTR).” The Russian designation is SSU (joint threat reduction).

To organize work at the interstate level, on June 17, 1992, the “Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation regarding the safe and secure transportation, storage and destruction of weapons and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons” was signed with a validity period of 7 years.

And on June 15-16, 1999, a special protocol was drawn up extending the validity of the 1992 Agreement for another 7 years. It was envisaged that the base created during the implementation of the SSU program would be used in the future to continue the process of disarmament and security.

At the same time, in response to the US initiative to allegedly stop the development of the railway-based MX ICBM, the then leadership of our country hastened to announce a refusal to further deploy and modernize the RS-22V ICBM.

More than a strange political decision. But at that time, based on “universal human values,” our government leadership could do anything. Most likely, it did not fully understand what it was doing. And to consult with specialists, as, for example, L.I. did. Brezhnev, it was not typical for them. After all, they can advise something that our overseas partners may not like. This was the case, for example, with the inexplicable decision to eliminate the newest fully deployed Oka operational-tactical missile systems.

The warranty period for the operation of the BZHRK 15P961 complex was initially relatively short; there was no experience in operating such complexes yet. It was then extended to 15 years. In accordance with this, this period of possible operation for the very first complexes put on duty was supposed to end in 2001. The service life of all 15Zh61 missiles was, for natural reasons, limited to the mid-2000s.

Unlike domestic rockets with liquid propellant engines, which serve for three decades when fueled, rockets with solid propellant rocket engines, due to the specifics of the fuel used, have a shorter service life. Even if the developers had carried out a large amount of work to confirm the possibility of further extending the service life, then with a certain risk one could hope for a very small additional extension.

Photo 84. Empty engine cases prepared for disposal

In principle, this is not an absolute dead end. In the United States, to extend the service life of the Minuteman family of missiles, solid fuel charges were removed from the engine casings and then filled with new fuel.

However, in the context of the breakdown of political and economic ties between Russia and Ukraine, the deficit of budgetary allocations, the unstable functioning of financial systems, the catastrophic degradation of governing bodies, the washing out of qualified and experienced specialists from them, the implementation of such a program in relation to the RT-23UTTH (15Zh61) missiles was unrealistic.

So the decommissioning and subsequent elimination of 15Zh61 missiles in 2002-2006. had not only political, but also technical reasons. But then they didn’t remember about it.

Subsequently, many leaders of the Russian Ministry of Defense expressed regret over the rash and hasty decision to decommission and liquidate the BZHRK. But in the literal sense, “the train has already left.” The decision to refuse to modernize the BZHRK complexes automatically limited the period of their solid-fuel missiles on combat duty to the warranty period of operation.

On September 1, 2005, the last missile division of the BZHRK was removed from combat duty. The creation of the BZHRK was a daunting task. But their elimination was also not an easy task. Significant forces of military units and industrial enterprises were involved in these works.

When it became clear that the service of the BZHRK was ending, the question of the possibility of creating a means for launching spacecraft on its basis was considered for some time. Studies on this issue were carried out at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and TsNIIMash. The idea stemmed from the successful conversion program of the Kosmotras International Space Corporation to transform the heavy RS-20 ICBMs developed by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau into the Dnepr launch vehicle. The author, together with enterprise specialists, had to analyze the possibility and feasibility of a similar use of BZHRK, while taking into account the experience already accumulated in the Dnepr program. The idea turned out to be quite difficult to implement technically; the design of the rocket, its warhead and launcher were too specific. The natural ability of the railway complex to launch spacecraft from any point was outweighed by the complexity of the program and its economic inefficiency. Work in this direction has not received development.

Photo 85. One of the structures of the permanent deployment point of the BZHRK abandoned after the end of their operation

To eliminate the BZHRK, the Russian Ministry of Defense organized storage and reloading bases for elements of the complex. This Bershet base was formed on the basis of a disbanded missile division. The main tasks of the base were to maintain operational equipment and technical systems of the BZHRK for unloading missiles, dismantling the equipment and sending it to the liquidation base; carrying out technical maintenance of BZHRK units and systems. Activities were also carried out there to decommission the BZHRK, unload the missiles and send them for disposal to industrial enterprises and liquidation bases.

The storage base for elements of the Krasnoyarsk combat railway missile system was also formed on the basis of a disbanded missile division. Its task was to ensure the operability of the equipment and, with its help, ensure that elements of the complex were sent to the Bershet base for the purpose of unloading missiles and dismantling the equipment. In the period 2002-2006. At the bases, the equipment of 12 BZHRK and two training launch modules was decommissioned and dismantled. Work was carried out to unload 36 RT-23UTTH missiles from railway mobile launchers and drain fuel from breeding units.

The missiles for further destruction were sent to the FSUE Perm Mashinostroitel Plant, where the appropriate facilities were created. At the neighboring site of another Perm enterprise, Research Institute of PM, fuel was burned out of solid fuel engine casings.

After liquidation, the equipment was sent to the arsenals of the Strategic Missile Forces. The components of the combat railway launch complex (BZhSK) were sent for further disposal of the cars to the Bryansk liquidation base.

The Bryansk Missile Equipment and Weapons Elimination Base was put into operation in September 2002 at the production facilities of the Bryansk Strategic Missile Forces Central Repair Plant. It was intended to ensure compliance with the terms of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of START in terms of the elimination of BZHRK modules, bringing them into a state unsuitable for the use of cars associated with the launch. Preparations for this process, supply of necessary equipment and development of liquidation technology were carried out by the ASKOND organization, which combined the experience of industry specialists and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. This organization, which continued the affairs of the 1st Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of General Engineering, had by this time accumulated extensive experience in implementing complex international conversion projects.

Photo 86. Liquidation of BZHRK cars at the Bryansk base

The work was carried out in accordance with Russian-American agreements. Under the control of US inspection teams, the following was carried out: removal of the installation and starting mechanism from the railway car; a section of frame from the installation and launching mechanism on which the ICBM is attached and lifted; removal of missile launch support equipment, including mounted instrument compartments, from the railway car; cutting a railway car into two approximately equal parts. As of the beginning of 2007, the BZHRK elimination program was completed, 34 railway mobile launchers were eliminated.

The fate of the permanent deployment points of the BZHRK was sad. After fulfilling the functions of storage and liquidation bases, security was removed from them, military units were disbanded, and the structures were abandoned. They were practically open to everyone, including looters. Some of the structures are completely out of order, and some are in a condition that still allows us to hope for the possibility of their revival after repair and re-equipment.

The history of the BZHRK could have continued, because simultaneously with the adoption in 1989 of the railway complex with the RT-23UTTKh missile, the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau began design work on the promising solid fuel complex "Ermak" (RT-23UTTKhM), it had to have high-quality best characteristics. All the experience gained was taken into account, new materials and fuels were used. The complex was designed, tested, and prepared for flight tests. The rocket of this complex No. 1L was manufactured in December 1991. But due to political reasons, work on this program was stopped.

The documentation and experience of creating a BZHRK in Ukraine have been preserved to some extent, and recently, with the development of the political crisis in Ukraine, justified fears have been expressed that the Ukrainian side, based on political interests and the difficult economic situation, will be forced to share information on the development of strategic missile systems with third countries. It cannot be completely ruled out that this may include information on railway-based complexes.

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A mobile missile system with powerful missiles, secretly located in railway cars.

The decree on the start of development in the USSR of a mobile complex of strategic missiles on a railway platform was issued in 1969. The developer of the complex is the Yuzhnoye design bureau (Dnepropetrovsk).

The reason was information about the creation in the States of a solid-fuel MX missile (the future LGM-118 Peacekeeper), intended for several deployment options, including railway ones. The Americans eventually limited themselves to only the silo version of their complex, and the USSR created a BZHRK with a missile that could also be deployed in silos.

The BZHRK was a train disguised as a regular one, with refrigerator cars, baggage and mail cars (four- and eight-axle).

The “missile train” included two diesel locomotives of the DM-62 type, a command post of seven, a tank car with supplies of fuel and lubricants and three three-car launchers with missiles. Such a train left its home base and, under the guise of an ordinary civilian train, plied the railway network, remaining ready to start.

BZHRK with the RT-23UTTH "Molodets" missile. Photo: Wikipedia

When creating the train, a lot of original solutions were used - from the creation of a unique load balancing system, which made it possible to evenly distribute the pressure from the car with the rocket to two neighboring cars, and ending with a mast system that carefully moved aside the electrical contact network above the tracks, which interfered with the launch of the rocket.

The first train went on combat duty on October 20, 1987. The Soviet Union created three divisions on “rocket trains”: near Kostroma, near Krasnoyarsk and near Perm, with a total of 36 launchers in 12 trains.

The RT-23UTTH “Molodets” (15Zh61) was chosen as the missile for the complex. The RT-23 missile also existed and, in fact, it all began with it, but in the process of creating the BZHRK it was decided to put it into service with a more advanced missile.

The RT-23UTTH missile weighing just under 105 tons carried 10 warheads with a yield of 430 kt each. The design of the rocket is solid fuel three-stage.

Since August 1988, a version of these missiles under the designation 15Zh60 began to be put into service with silo missile systems. The main difference between the 15Zh60 rocket and the 15Zh61 was the use of new high-energy fuel of the Opal type, as well as a set of measures to increase resistance to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. Until July 1991, 56 missiles were deployed, the last ones being withdrawn from service in 1999.

The last “missile trains” were withdrawn from service by the Russian Strategic Missile Forces in the early 2000s. This was due to the high cost of maintenance and pressure from Washington, as well as the difficulties of operating heavy “missile carriers” on unfortified railway tracks, for which practically no money was allocated in the 90s. Finally, the warranty period of the RT-23UTTH missiles (15 years) was ending, and it was impossible to get new ones: their developer and manufacturer was the Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhmash, which remained in Ukraine after 1991.

However, at the moment, a decision has been made to restore the BZHRK as part of the Strategic Missile Forces. It was reported that in 2014, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering was supposed to complete the preliminary design of the new complex. For the new version, which will be smaller than the previous one, the lighter Yars rocket was chosen. As reported, such complexes may appear in service before 2020.

GRAU index - 15P961 and 15P060, START code - RS-22B and RS-22V, according to the US and NATO classification - SS-24 Mod 3 and Mod 2 Scalpel, English. Scalpel (PL-4 - during testing at the test site)

Strategic missile systems with solid fuel three-stage intercontinental ballistic missiles 15Zh61 and 15Zh60, mobile railway and stationary silo-based, respectively. It is a subsequent development of the RT-23 complex.

The main developer is the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau. Entered service in 1987.

Missile systems

Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 768-247 (dated 08/09/1983) provided for the creation of a single missile for three deployment options: stationary (in a silo) and mobile (railway and ground). In April 1984, the developers of complexes based on the RT-23UTTH missiles were issued updated technical specifications, which determined that the creation of a single missile should take into account the features of operation and combat use as part of mobile and stationary complexes. The development order was also determined - first the mobile complexes, then the stationary one.

The development of the ground mobile complex with the 15Zh62 rocket (Tselina-2 theme) was carried out by MIT. To transport the rocket, a project was created and prototypes of the MAZ-7907 tractor were assembled. However, further work on the complex was stopped when it became obvious that it would not be able to provide the necessary characteristics of combat effectiveness.

The development of the Combat Railway Missile Complex (BZHRK) under the leadership of the brothers Vladimir and Alexey Utkin was a further development of the 15P952 complex based on the RT-23 (15Zh52) missile. For the new complex, a modification of the R-23 UTTH 15ZH61 missile was created (NATO designation: SS-24 “Scalpel” Mod 3 (PL-4), START-1: RS-22V), and the complex itself received the index 15P961. The complex entered service on November 28, 1987. During 2003-2007, all complexes were removed from service and cut into scrap metal.

The stationary mine complex was also created on the basis of the RT-23 (complex 15P044 with the 15Zh44 missile). The complex received the designation 15P060 (BRK 15P161, NATO designation: SS-24 “Scalpel” Mod 2, START-1: RS-22B). The 15P760 launchers were designed as a modernization of the UR-100N UTTH missile systems.

The complex was adopted for service on November 28, 1989. A total of 56 missiles of this type were deployed in positional areas on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR. However, due to changes in the defense doctrine of the USSR and political and economic difficulties, further deployment of missiles was stopped. After the collapse of the USSR, the missiles located on the territory of Ukraine were removed from combat duty and disposed of (including a backlog of at least 8 missiles) in the period 1993-2002. The launchers were blown up. In Russia, the missiles were taken off duty and sent for disposal after the warranty storage period expired in 2001. The launchers were modernized to use RT-2PM2 Topol-M missiles.

In 2006, the US Department of Defense agreed to pay Ukraine an agreed upon price for each empty engine casing. At the same time, NKAU will bear the costs of extracting fuel from the existing 163 rocket engines.

Rocket design

The RT-23 UTTH is made in the same caliber and, in its design and layout, is in many ways similar to the American MX missile. The design of the 15Zh60 and 15Zh61 missiles is somewhat different. Below, by default, the design of the 15Zh61 rocket (for the BZHRK) is considered.

First stage design

The first stage of the ICBM includes a cylindrical tail and connecting compartments and a sustainer solid propellant rocket engine. The mass of the fully equipped stage is 53.7 tons. The length of the stage is 9.7 m. The engine is of a cocoon design with one centrally located fixed nozzle.

For the 15Zh60, a completely new solid propellant rocket engine 15D305 was created with a cocoon-design body and a central rotary nozzle, in the most thermally stressed critical section of which an insert made of carbon-carbon composite material was used. HMX-based OPAL fuel.

Second stage design

The second stage consists of a 15D290 propulsion solid propellant rocket engine and a connecting compartment. The second stage sustainer solid propellant rocket engine has one centrally located nozzle, which is equipped with a retractable nozzle, which allows maintaining the original dimensions and increasing the specific impulse of the engine when operating at high altitudes. It differed from the 15D207 engine of the second stage of the RT-23 with a new high-energy mixed fuel of the START type and increased resistance to PFYAV (damaging factors of a nuclear explosion). The solid propellant rocket motor body is of cocoon design.

Third stage design

The third stage includes a 15D291 main engine (borrowed from the 15Zh52 rocket without changes), similar in design to the second stage solid propellant rocket engine, and a transition compartment consisting of two sections.

Head part

The missile is equipped with a MIRV IN (multiple warhead with individual guidance units) with ten warheads (warhead) located in one tier. The breeding stage is made according to a standard scheme and includes a remote control and a control system.

The warhead is covered with an aerodynamic fairing of variable geometry (initially inflatable, later folding). This design of the fairing is due to the presence of restrictions imposed on the dimensions of the rocket by the dimensions of the railway car.

On the outer surface of the fairing there are aerodynamic rudders that allow you to control the rocket in roll during the operation of the first and second stages. After passing through the dense layers of the atmosphere, the fairing is discarded.

BZHRK device

The BZHRK includes: three diesel locomotives DM62, a command post consisting of 7 cars, a tank car with reserves of fuel and lubricants and three launchers (PU) with missiles. The rolling stock for the BZHRK was assembled at the Kalinin Freight Car Building Plant.

The BZHRK looks like an ordinary train consisting of refrigerated, mail, luggage and passenger cars. Fourteen cars have eight wheel pairs, and three have four. Three cars are disguised as passenger fleet cars, the rest, eight-axle, are “refrigerated” cars. Thanks to the available supplies on board, the complex could operate autonomously for up to 28 days.

The launch car is equipped with an opening roof and a device for discharging the contact network. The weight of the rocket was about 104 tons, with a launch container - 126 tons. Firing range - 10,100 km, rocket length - 23.0 m, launch container length - 21 m, maximum missile body diameter - 2.4 m. To solve the problem of launcher overload Each carriage uses special unloading devices that redistribute part of the weight to adjacent carriages.

The rocket has an original folding fairing of the head section. This solution was used to reduce the length of the rocket and place it in the carriage. The length of the rocket is 22.6 meters.

The missiles could be launched from any point along the route. The launch algorithm is as follows: the train stops, a special device moves to the side and short-circuits the contact network to the ground, the launch container assumes a vertical position. After this, a mortar launch of the rocket can be carried out. Already in the air, the rocket is deflected with the help of a powder accelerator and only after that the main engine is started. Deflecting the rocket made it possible to divert the propulsion engine jet away from the launch complex and the railway track, avoiding their damage. The time for all these operations, from receiving a command from the General Staff to launching the rocket, was up to three minutes.

Each of the three launchers included in the BZHRK can launch both as part of a train and independently.

The cost of one RT-23 UTTH “Molodets” missile in 1985 prices was about 22 million rubles. In total, about 100 products were produced at the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant.

TTX

Missile system index
Launcher	Mine type "OS" (separate start), automated, index 15P760	Railway of three cars, launch complex 15P261, launch module 15P761
Rocket index	15Zh60	15Zh61
Maximum range, km	10 450	10 100
Launch weight, t	104,8	104,5
Throwable mass of warhead, kg	4050	4050
Rocket length (in TPK/in flight), m	21,9/23	22,6/23,3
Maximum diameter of the rocket body, m	2,4	2,4
MS type		Multiple individually targeted warhead
Number of BB x power, Mt	10 x 0.43	10 x 0.43
Control system type	Autonomous, inertial	Autonomous, inertial
Circular probable deviation, km	0,22	0,2-0,5
Fuel	Mixed solid (OPAL at the first stage, START at the second)	Mixed solid (T9-BK-8E at the first stage, START at the second, AP-65 at the third)
Stage 1 engine thrust (on the ground/in the void), tf	280/310	218/241
Specific thrust impulse in vacuum, s	280	271,2
Controls		Valves for gas injection into the supercritical part of the nozzle
Flight reliability	n/a	0,98

Surviving copies

The 15Zh61 missile is exhibited in the branch of the Central Museum of the Strategic Missile Forces in the Training Center of the Military Academy of the Strategic Missile Forces named after. Peter the Great in Balabanovo, Kaluga region.

In Russia, a new nuclear weapon is preparing for the final stage of testing - the Barguzin combat railway missile system (BZHRK), created on the basis of its predecessor, the Molodets BZHRK (SS-24 Scalpel), which was on combat duty from 1987 to 2005 and was withdrawn from service by agreement with the United States in 1993. What forced Russia to return to the creation of these weapons again? When once again in 2012 the Americans confirmed the deployment of their missile defense facilities in Europe, Russian President Vladimir Putin quite harshly formulated Russia’s response to this. He officially stated that the creation of an American missile defense system actually “nullifies our nuclear missile potential,” and announced that our answer would be “the development of strike nuclear missile systems.” One of such complexes was the Barguzin BZHRK, which the American military especially did not like , causing them serious concern, since its adoption makes the presence of a US missile defense system as such practically useless. Predecessor of "Bargruzin" "Well done" The BZHRK was already in service with the Strategic Missile Forces until 2005. Its main developer in the USSR was the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (Ukraine). The only manufacturer of rockets is the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant. Tests of the BZHRK with the RT-23UTTKh "Molodets" missile (according to NATO classification - SS-24 Scalpel) in the railway version began in February 1985 and were completed by 1987. BZHRKs looked like ordinary railway trains made of refrigerated, mail-baggage and even passenger cars. Inside each train there were three launchers with Molodets solid propellant missiles, as well as the entire support system for them with a command post and combat crews. The first BZHRK was put on combat duty in 1987 in Kostroma. In 1988, five regiments were deployed (a total of 15 launchers), and by 1991, three missile divisions: near Kostroma, Perm and Krasnoyarsk - each consisted of four missile regiments (a total of 12 BZHRK trains). Each train consisted of several cars . One carriage is a command post, the other three – with an opening roof – are launchers with missiles. Moreover, the missiles could be launched both from planned stops and from any point along the route. To do this, the train was stopped, a special device was used to move the contact suspension of electrical wires to the sides, the launch container was placed in a vertical position, and the rocket was launched.
The complexes stood at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in permanent shelters. Within a radius of 1,500 kilometers from their bases, together with railway workers, work was carried out to strengthen the track: heavier rails were laid, wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete ones, embankments were filled with denser crushed stone. power only to professionals (launch modules with a rocket had eight wheel pairs, the rest of the support cars had four pairs each). The train could cover about 1,200 kilometers in one day. Its combat patrol time was 21 days (thanks to the reserves on board, it could operate autonomously for up to 28 days). Great importance was attached to the BZHRK, even the officers who served on these trains had ranks higher than their colleagues in similar positions in the mine complexes.
Soviet BZHRK– shock for Washington The rocket scientists tell either a legend or a true story that the Americans themselves allegedly pushed our designers to create the BZHRK. They say that one day our intelligence received information that the United States was working on creating a railway complex that would be able to move through underground tunnels and, if necessary, emerge from the ground at certain points in order to launch a strategic missile unexpectedly for the enemy. Photographs were even attached to the intelligence officers’ report this train. Apparently, these data made a strong impression on the Soviet leadership, since it was immediately decided to create something similar. But our engineers approached this issue more creatively. They decided: why drive trains underground? You can put them on regular railways, disguised as freight trains. It will be simpler, cheaper and more effective. Later, however, it turned out that the Americans conducted special studies that showed that in their conditions, BZHRKs would not be effective enough. They simply slipped misinformation to us in order to once again shake up the Soviet budget, forcing us, as it seemed to them then, into useless spending, and the photo was taken from a small full-scale model.
But by the time all this became clear, it was too late for Soviet engineers to work back. They, and not only in the drawings, have already created a new nuclear weapon with an individually targeted missile, a range of ten thousand kilometers with ten warheads with a capacity of 0.43 Mt and a serious set of means for overcoming missile defense. In Washington, this news caused a real shock. Still would! How do you determine which of the “freight trains” to destroy in the event of a nuclear strike? If you shoot at everyone at once, there won’t be enough nuclear warheads. Therefore, in order to track the movement of these trains, which easily escaped the field of view of tracking systems, the Americans had to almost constantly keep a constellation of 18 spy satellites over Russia, which was very costly for them. Especially considering that the US intelligence services never managed to identify the BZHRK along the patrol route. Therefore, as soon as the political situation allowed in the early 90s, the US immediately tried to get rid of this headache. At first, they persuaded the Russian authorities not to allow the BZHRKs to travel around the country, but to remain laid up. This allowed them to constantly keep only three or four spy satellites over Russia instead of 16–18. And then they persuaded our politicians to completely destroy the BZHRK. They officially agreed under the pretext of the alleged “expiration of the warranty period for their operation.”
How to cut "Scalpels" The last combat train was sent for melting down in 2005. Eyewitnesses said that when, in the twilight of the night, the wheels of the cars clattered on the rails and the nuclear “ghost train” with Scalpel missiles set off on its final journey, even the strongest men could not stand it: tears rolled from the eyes of both gray-haired designers and rocket officers . They said goodbye to a unique weapon, which in many combat characteristics surpassed everything that was available and even planned to be put into service in the near future. Everyone understood that this unique weapon in the mid-90s became hostage to the political agreements of the country’s leadership with Washington. And not selfish. Apparently, therefore, each new stage of the destruction of the BZHRK strangely coincided with the next tranche of a loan from the International Monetary Fund. The refusal of the BZHRK had a number of objective reasons. In particular, when Moscow and Kyiv “fled up” in 1991, this immediately hit Russian nuclear power hard. Almost all of our nuclear missiles during the Soviet era were made in Ukraine under the leadership of academicians Yangel and Utkin. Of the 20 types then in service, 12 were designed in Dnepropetrovsk, at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, and produced there, at the Yuzhmash plant. BZHRK was also made in the Ukrainian Pavlograd.
But each time it became more and more difficult to negotiate with the developers from Nezalezhnaya to extend their service life or modernize them. As a result of all these circumstances, our generals had to report with a sour face to the country’s leadership how “in accordance with the planned reduction of the Strategic Missile Forces, another BZHRK has been removed from combat duty.” But what to do: the politicians promised - the military was forced to fulfill it. At the same time, they understood perfectly well: if we cut and remove missiles from combat duty due to old age at the same pace as in the late 90s, then in just five years, instead of the existing 150 Voyevods, we will not have any of these heavy missiles left. And then no light Topols will make any difference - and at that time there were only about 40 of them. For the American missile defense system, this is nothing. For this reason, as soon as Yeltsin vacated the Kremlin office, a number of people from the country’s military leadership, at the request of the rocket scientists, began to prove to the new president the need to create a nuclear complex similar to the BZHRK. And when it became finally clear that the United States was not going to abandon its plans to create its own missile defense system under any circumstances, work on the creation of this complex really began. And now, in the very near future, the States will again receive their previous headache, now in the form of a new BZHRK generation called "Barguzin". Moreover, as the rocket scientists say, these will be ultra-modern rockets in which all the shortcomings of the Scalpel have been eliminated.
"Barguzin"– the main trump card against US missile defense The main disadvantage noted by opponents of the BZHRK was the accelerated wear and tear of the railway tracks along which it moved. They had to be repaired frequently, over which the military and railway workers had eternal disputes. The reason for this was the heavy missiles - weighing 105 tons. They did not fit in one car - they had to be placed in two, strengthening the wheel pairs on them. Today, when issues of profit and commerce have come to the fore, Russian Railways are certainly not ready, as it was before, to infringe on their interests for the sake of the country's defense, and also bear the costs of repairing the roadway in the event that a decision is made that BZHRKs should again operate on their roads. It was the commercial reason, according to some experts, that today could become an obstacle to the final decision to adopt them into service. However, this problem has now been removed. The fact is that the new BZHRKs will no longer have heavy missiles. The complexes are armed with lighter RS-24 missiles, which are used in the Yars complexes, and therefore the weight of the car is comparable to the usual one, which makes it possible to achieve ideal camouflage of the combat personnel. However, the RS-24s have only four warheads, and older missiles had them ten. But here we must take into account that the Barguzin itself does not carry three missiles, as it was before, but twice as many. This, of course, is the same - 24 versus 30. But we should not forget that Yars are practically the most modern development and their probability of overcoming missile defense is much higher than that of their predecessors. The navigation system has also been updated: now there is no need to set target coordinates in advance, everything can be changed quickly.
In a day, such a mobile complex can cover up to 1,000 kilometers, plying along any railway lines in the country, indistinguishable from a regular train with refrigerated cars. Autonomy time is a month. There is no doubt that the new group of BZHRK will be a much more effective response to the US missile defense system than even the deployment of our Iskander operational-tactical missiles near the borders of Europe, which are so feared in the West. There is also no doubt that the Americans are interested in the idea of ​​BZHRK obviously will not like it (although theoretically their creation will not violate the latest Russian-American agreements). BZHRK at one time formed the basis of the retaliatory strike force in the Strategic Missile Forces, since they had increased survivability and were very likely to survive after the enemy delivered the first strike. The United States feared it no less than the legendary “Satan,” since the BZHRK was a real factor in inevitable retribution. Until 2020, it is planned to put into service five regiments of the Barguzin BZHRK—that’s 120 warheads, respectively. Apparently, the BZHRK will become the strongest argument, in fact, our main trump card in the dispute with the Americans regarding the advisability of deploying a global missile defense system.